French reconstruction in a European context by LYNCH, Frances M. B.
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION
"Challenge and Response in Western 
Europe: the Origins of the European 
Community (1945 - 1950)"
Project directed by Professor Alan Milward
Project Paper No. 11
E U- I W O R K I N G .  P A P E R  No. 86̂


































































































This paper should not be reproduced in whole or 
in part without the prior permission of the author.
Paper presented in the conference held on 
17 and 18 November 1983 entitled
"National and International Economic Recon­
struction in Western Europe,1945-1950"
(C), Frances Lynch 1984 
Printed in Italy in February 1984 
European University Institute 
3adia Fiesolana 




























































































This paper is an analysis of the reconstruction 
of the French economy within the international economy.
It examines both the constraints on domestic economic 
policy stemming from the need to participate in an inter­
national economy and the attempts by French policy makers 
to create a framework larger than the national one in which 
to achieve national objectives.
When France signed the lend-lease agreement with 
the United States in February 1945 it undertook to abolish 
all forms of discrimination in international trade and to 
reduce tariffs and other customs barriers by an unspecified 
date. Few in France doubted the potential advantages to be 
derived from participation in what came to be known as the 
Bretton Woods system. The development of protective trade 
blocs in the 1930s had forced the French to reduce their 
trade and direct it towards their colonies. But the colo­
nial markets were no substitute for former European markets 
so that while the percentage of total imports supplied by 
the French colonies increased from 20.9 per cent in 1932 
to 27.2 per cent in 1938, they absorbed a smaller proportion 
of French exports —  27.5 per cent in 1938 compared with 
31.5 per cent in 1932. It was felt that this decline in 
trade had restricted growth and stifled investment oppor­
tunities so that while other countries had been investing in 
the 1930s and during the war, the French economy had stag­
nated. So fifteen years of lost investment had to be made up 
before the French economy could hope to survive and compete 
in a world of free trade. It was on this understanding that 




























































































The disappearance of Germany as the major industrial 
power in Europe provided the French with an opportunity to 
expand their industry beyond the highest level achieved in the 
interwar period in the hope of replacing Germany as the major 
centre and supplier of heavy industry in Europe! This pro­
vided the basis for the five year modernization plan which 
was drawn up in 1946. Priority in investments and imports 
was to be given to the six basic sectors of coal, steel, 
electricity, transport, cement and agricultural equipment.
It was a plan for industrial modernization which marked a 
sharp break with the idea of the 'balanced economy1 so pre­
valent in the 1930s and under Vichy. A half-hearted attempt 
was made to modernize the backward agricultural sector through 
increased mechanization.
It was hoped that the imports required for recon­
struction and modernization would be largely financed by 
American credits on the scale of the recently negotiated 
British loan. France had been assured of second place in 
the round of discussions to wind up lend lease in which Britain 
ranked first.
In preparation for these discussions Monnet made it 
clear to the Americans that the French needed a large lump 
sum credit if they were to proceed with their modernization 
plan which was to enable them to adopt American commercial 
policies. Without such an assurance he warned, French re­
construction would take longer and operate within a closed 
economy. On the other hand piecemeal credits would only han­
dicap French planning procedures and prevent a proper syn­
chronization of France's modernization programme with pro-




























































































However, as the French realized if they managed to 
get a substantial credit they would have to be prepared to 
grant concessions similar to those demanded of the British. 
This would mean an end to both exchange controls on current 
payments and discriminatory trading practices in carrying 
out their import programme by an agreed date. And once moder­
nized, French industry would have to be content with an ad 
valorem tariff on imports varying between 10 and 25 per cent;
3depending on the sector. But modernizing French agriculture 
was much more complicated since it necessitated not only 
increased mechanization but also creating larger farm units 
and overcoming the psychological barrier which French farmers 
had towards using modern methodq . Thi«s meant that agricul­
ture would have to be protected for" a period longer than
4the five years envisaged for French industry. Even at this 
stage it was clear that there were two quite distinct policies 
for modernization. One was planned investment in the basic 
sectors while the other was to result from the pressure on 
the rest of French industry from international competition 
once the plan was completed.
The other major concession exacted from the British 
government had been a renunciation of its Imperial Preference 
Scheme. By analogy the French government expected the Ameri­
cans to ask them to draw up a policy for the future c£ the 
French Overseas Territories which would either incorporate 
them into a French customs union or abolish all preferential 
tariffs between them and Metropolitan France. While the ul­
timate aim of both the colonies and Metropolitan France was 




























































































Monnet Plan was based on French industry availing of the 
extensive markets of the colonies during the period of 
reconstruction. For this reason those colonies which thought 
they could get American aid independently were discouraged 
and had to submit to being included in the overall demands 
made by the French government at Washington^.
But American policy was evolving along lines quite 
different from those imagined in Paris. Before the Washing­
ton talks opened the National Advisory Council met to dis­
cuss the American government's policy regarding foreign 
loans. It was accepted without question that Britain was 
a special case since "no other country had the sane crucial 
position in world trade". This meant that the financial 
and commercial practices of Britain were of the utmost 
significance in determining what sort of international eco­
nomy would be set up. But the needs of other countries were 
to be met by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and until it could start operations, all loans 
for reconstruction and development were to be met by the
Export- Import Bank and limited to the immediate, minimum
6needs of the borrower.
To demonstrate to the Americans how the French plan 
would enable the French economy to participate in the Bretton 
Woods system, the French planners drew up an estimate of 
the balance of payments for the period 1946-1949. The import 
bill for the 4-year period was projected at 11,000 million 
dollars, of which 5,000 million dollars were to be spent in 
the United States on supplies, equipment and freight. Of 
the remaining 6,000 million dollars at least three million 




























































































1946 was to be over 3,000 million dollars, it was to drop 
by about 1,000 million dollars annually until the balance 
of payments would be in equilibrium by 1949. Exports were 
to rise from 450 million dollars in 1946 to 2,000 million 
dollars in 1949. Of this, 17.5 per cent were to be exported 
from the French colonies. Metropolitan France alone was to 
export over 27 per cent of its total exports to the United 
States in 1949, compared with 7.6 per cent in 1938. These 
were to be mainly textiles and chemical and industrial pro­
ducts. Sixteen per cent of French exports were to go to
7Britain and the Sterling Area.
But the Americans were most alarmed at the contrast
between the French export policy and that of Britain. Whereas
Britain planned to increase its exports by 40 per cent in 1947
French exports were to be very low at a time when foreign
8exchange requirements were highest.
But this reflected a conflict between the planners 
and the government. While the Ministry of Finance in par­
ticular wanted each industry to be forced to export a cer­
tain percentage of its production in order to alleviate the 
balance of payments and secure a foothold in foreign markets, 
the planners were only willing to let non-essential goods 
be exported as long as shortages of essential goods existed
gin France. Insertion into the international economy was to 
be the result of modernization but not the driving force be­
hind it. The planners had hoped for a credit of over 4,000 
million dollars from the United States. Instead they got 
650 million dollars and no assurance that the coal which they 
were demanding from-Germany as reparations and on which the 




























































































The Ruhr was in any case in the British zone of occu­
pation. Months of negotiations with the British followed 
which led to the creation of an Anglo-French Economic Com­
mittee. This became the framework for a series of French 
suggestions to coordinate the two countries' investment plans 
and on that basis to work out a policy for the future of the 
German economy!1 But the long-term position of Germany within 
the European economy was a question which did not preoccupy 
the Brititsh. In addition the French suggestion smacked of 
market-sharing arrangements which had no place in the li­
beral order of the Bretton Woods system.
Through Marshall Aid though the Americans hoped to 
produce a solution to the problem of Germany. It was to be 
reconstructed within the context of a more closely inte­
grated European economy, which in itself would mark a coor­
dinated transition towards the liberal economic system of 
Bretton Woods. Marshall Aid also held the premise of a so­
lution to the French planners' problem of financing the dollar 
imports of equipment so crucial for the realization of 
their investment plan and of supplies necessary for the 
French economy in general. Despite the French government's 
stated policy in August 1947 of cutting all imports from the 
dollar area except for food and fuel, imports actually in­
creased in the second half of 1947 compared with the first
12six months, while exports declined. The main problem was 
that only three per cent of French exports were going to 
the United States while it supplied about thirty per cent 
of French importsPOtherwise despite the higher rate of in­




























































































of essential goods, France had a trade surplus with all west 
European countries in 1947 except for the rather special 
case of the western zones of Germany.
So rather than devalue the franc in terms of all 
currencies by the same amount, the new Finance Minister 
René Mayer introduced a system of multiple rates. His scheme 
involved devaluing the franc by eighty per cent —  bringing 
it from 119 francs to the dollar to 214 francs. All essen­
tial goods were to be imported at this rate. But at the same 
time a parallel free market rate was allowed between the 
franc and the dollar and other hard currencies. And it was 
at this free rate that imports of non-essential goods had 
to be bought. Exporters had to sell half their foreign ex­
change proceeds on the free market and half at the official 
rate of exchange}4
According to the rules of the IMF any alteration of 
an exchange rate had to be discussed beforehand. But when 
the British heard of the French scheme they immediately 
opposed it on the grounds that it would undermine sterling 
and lead to disorder and instability in western Europe. They 
argued that it would be easy for the French to import British 
goods and sell them in the United States, giving Britain 
francs instead of dollars. The Americans were more ambiva­
lent. The State Department was concerned lest the IMF should 
block a measure which a member country considered to be in 
its best interest —  a curious criticism since that was one 
of the main reasons why the IMF had been set up}5The Treasury 
felt that in the absence of better alternatives, the French 




























































































achieving exchange rate stability —  although the French 
had made it clear that it would last as long as was necessary. 
The National Advisory Coundil was afraid that the French 
scheme might start an exchange rate war and thus nullify the 
whole purpose of the IMF.
The staff of the IMF made the suggestion that France 
should set up a free market for other currencies as well 
as the dollar. This would have the advantage of eliminating 
most of the discrimination, would not be a competitive de­
valuation and would avoid ccmmoddty arbitrage —  although it 
would still contravene the rules of the IMF. But Mendes-France, 
the French representative at the IMF had the last word. He 
argued that there would be considerable difficulty in rever­
sing the French proposal —  the major one being that since 
the sultan of Morocco had not been informed of the previous 
devaluation but had been told of this one with which he was 
in agreement, the French government could not possibly offend 
him again by changing it}^
Marshall Aid was to last until June 1952 whereas the 
original French Modernization Plan was to end in 1950. The 
plan had obviously to be revised if France was to make a 
case for aid after 1950. By June 1948 the Commissariat au 
Plan had drawn up what became known as the Long-term pro­
gramme which was once again designed to make the French eco­
nomy viable within the international economy by 1952. Accor­
ding to Monnet it was at his suggestion that the other mem­
bers of OEEC were asked to do the same. Not only had the 
original modernization plan been extended to cover more sec­
tors of the economy but many of the basic assumptions on 




























































































change was that agricultural production was to be raised 
by twenty-five per cent not only to save on imports but also 
in the hope that France would export wheat and meat to West 
Germany to replace what had previously been imported from 
eastern Europe, in return for coal, to Britain in return 
for wool from the Sterling Area and to Belgium in return 
for copper. The earlier plan to increase exports to the United 
States so that it absorbed over twenty-seven per cent of 
French exports by 1949 was now quite correctly seen to be 
totally fantastic. The more modest objective was now to 
export about 5.5 per cent of the total to the United States 
by 1952. Even more startling was the fact that beneath the 
rhetoric of closer cooperation in Europe the planners en­
visaged increasing French exports to their overseas terri­
tories from twenty-seven per cent in 1938 to about forty per 
cent by 1952 and reducing exports to the OEEC countries from 
fifty per cent to forty per cent1.7
The first draft of the Long-term programme predicted 
an overall deficit with the United States of 253 million dol­
lars in 1952 which was to be balanced by a surplus with the 
18OEEC countries. What assumptions about the international eco­
nomy were made in this long-term programme? Despite Monnet's 
claim in his Mémoires that the plan for agriculture marked 
a break in a tradition of protection dating back to Méline, 
the plan was based on discrimination against the United States. 
It presupposed the end of the British system of Imperial Pre­
ferences and an end to agricultural protection in other,European 
countries but also an extreme gullibility on the part of European 




























































































to predict a final deficit with the United States which 
was almost as large as its import bill.
When the plan was finally discussed in the interminis- 
terial economic committee in October 1948 after a summer of 
political turmoil, the lack of consensus was evident. Petsche 
criticized it on the grounds that the increase in agricultu­
ral exports, even if desirable or possible, was to European 
countries and so would do nothing to reduce France's dollar 
deficit. Queuille, on the other hand argued that exports would 
have to be cut since the French consumer had been deprived 
for too long^®
It is true that exports had been increasing steadily
21since the war and at a faster rate than industrial production. 
Exports in 1948 were 96 per cent of the 1938 level whereas 
consumption was 95 per cent. It was imports which had fallen 
from 105 per cent of the prewar level in 1947 to 101 per cent 
in 1948. ECA shared Petsche's misgivings about the size of 
French exports particularly to the United States, and in a 
meeting on 15 November 1948 Bruce called on the French go­
vernment to take the necessary measures to increase exports
and to exercise greater vigilance in detecting infringements
22on exchange controls. The following day he was more explicit
and told Queuille that the French government would have to
increase taxes, restrain wages, in order to reduce infla-
23tion and increase exports.
The Ministry of Finance tried to claim that, in the 
absence of a complete administrative reorganization it was 
almost impossible to implement an export policy. The Ministries 




























































































with domestic supply than exports, the Commissariat au Plan 
had not been in favour of increasing exports until 1948 while 
the only policy coordinating body, the Interministerial Economic 
Committee, had faded out of existence. The alternative of re­
stricting imports was also considered unworkable by the Ministry 
of Finance since France,unlike,it seemed, Britain, was incapable 
of enforcing a strict rationing system.
The other traditional method of boosting exports was by 
devaluation but after the devaluation of the franc in October 
1948 against all non-convertible currencies to bring it to the 
mid point between the official rate and the free rate for 
the dollar, a study had shown that only one third of French 
exports were considered to be too expensive. But at the same 
time the Ministry of Finance felt that costs should be reduced 
by cutting down social security payments and exports stimulated 
by reducing domestic demand. And what more obvious way to do 
this than by using counterpart funds for deflationary purposes 
instead of using them to boost domestic demand
The problem was essentially one of increasing exports
to the United States. And in view of the fact that taken to­
gether, all European countries hoped to increase their exports 
to the dollar zone by 42 per cent compared with 1938, it seemed 
to the French that the best solution would be to cooperate rather 
than compete in this effort. But what did this term cooperation 
mean, and how compatible would it be ultimately with a liberal 
national economy? To the Ministry of Finance it meant drawing up 




























































































ticularly from the Sterling Area similar to the ones Britain 
benefitted from,,as well as sales contracts. It meant elimi­
nating competition between European countries in third mar­
kets, passing legislation to prevent competition between 
countries and liberalizing the European payments system to 
facilitate trade. In this way countries could specialize in those lines of 
production for which they had a comparative advantage, and by availing of the 
European market could benefit frcm economies of scale which would reduce costs and 
make exports competitive in the United States. The combi­
nation of increased production and trade and
lower costs would lead to a higher standard of living. To 
meet this European industries should also increase the pro­
duction of luxury goods where they would not be faced with 
American competition.
If this sounded like a highly controlled system the 
Ministry of Finance was firm that it should not be controlled 
by governments. In many cases governments had neither the 
will nor the power to control industry. A more realistic al­
ternative was for governments to encourage industrialists to 
cooperate, not on the basis of the interwar cartels where 
industries had a monopoly of the national markets and shared 
out third markets, but on the basis of one large European mar­
ket where industries had to specialize. This could take the 
form of a continental customs union which could have mutually
advantageous links with the British Commonwealth,if indeed
25that remained a separate entity.
The funds necessary to finance the adjustment in pro­
duction caused by such specialization would come from a Euro­




























































































governments, and would make decisions on economic rather than 
political grounds.
A European Banking Committee had been set up in July- 
1948 to study the application of Marshall Aid. The purpose 
had been to see how countries could be helped to balance 
their payments within their plans drawn up for OEEC —  while 
avoiding over-investment leading to wasteful competition. They 
hoped to raises private American capital and get financial
? f ibacking from ECA.
But Guindey, director of external financial relations
within the Ministry of Finance made it clear that it was up
27to governments to decide the viability of investments. But 
while that was French policy it was not so true of Italy,
Belgium or Switzerland and as the pressure to liberalize 
European trade grew, so did this idea to set up a European 
Bank which could finance the dislocation to industry caused 
by the removal of barriers.
The French planners' view of cooperation was rather 
different. During a meeting with his supposed counterpart in 
Britain, called at Monnet' s insistence, he told Plowden that 
most of the current expressions about specialization, coope­
ration and integration were little more than popular catch­
words with no hope of becoming policy. His alternative was 
that those responsible for planning in Britain and France should 
discuss the economic problems of both countries as if they 
were one economy, outside the official structure of govern­
ments and civil services to determine what more fundamental 
transformation could be realised. The French planners had been making 




























































































Plcwden rejected not only this independence from the 
official machine of government but equally any attempt to 
involve industrialists in the work of the planning committees 
which was so central to the French concept of planning. While 
the British agreed to discuss the coordination of investment 
for oil, steel and fertilizers and possibly for coal and elec­
tricity in the future, the French also wanted to include tex­
tiles, chemicals,engineering and agriculture. But the British 
felt that it would only work in industries where unit invest­
ment was large and where governments were actually in a posi­
tion to implement the decisions reached —  if there was a 
danger of total over-investment. Otherwise the British pre­
ferred to leave such decisions to the market.
As far as the French plan was concerned, the British 
felt the estimated dollar deficit which had been scaled down 
to 140 million dollars by 1952 was still quite unacceptable.
Since they had no’.confidence in French attempts to increase ex­
ports to the United States by■ whatever method, they considered 
that planned imports of oil, cotton and equipment would 
have to be reduced significantly. As for other trade, it 
was calculated- that the French programme was based on export
prices higher and import prices lower as compared with pre-
29•-war than any of the main OEEC countries *
By 1952 the French estimated that payments between 
the Sterling Area and the Franc Area would be in balance whereas 
the British long-term programme showed the franc area having 
a deficit with the sterling area to the tune of about 90 mil­
lion dollars. The discrepancy was to a large extent due to 




























































































They were unable to believe that the planners would succeed 
in changing French farming practices over 4 years in order 
to increase output by twenty-five per cent. In any case they 
intended to use the French offer of wheat exports in order 
to bring down the price of Canadian wheat, rather than to im­
port French wheat.
If there was to be any more fundamental cooperation 
between the two countries as Monnet hoped then the British 
felt that the Fren^^a? to change. A greater equality in in­
come distribution in Britain had reduced demand for luxury 
products. It was up to the French, for example, to persuade 
vinegrowers to grow something else or at least aim to produce 
poorer quality wine?0
The general conclusions drawn by the British from 
their discussions with Monnet were that the French were an­
xious to increase their exports to Britain in order to pay 
for raw materials from the sterling area, that they wanted 
to increase their level of industrialization through specia­
lization and increase their exports through the use of Bri­
tish trade connections. But in return
it was felt that the French were unable
to make any contribution to solving Britain's main problem 
which was to reduce dollar imports. Reducing imports from Ca­
nada was of no interest to Britain. In the words of a Treasury 
official, "France is trying to recover by turning herself into 
a British supplier and climbing out of her difficulties on 
our backs. Only Germany is large enough, skilled enough and 
organized enough to alter, as distinct from following, the trend 




























































































GermanIt was precisely to reverse this/leadership that the 
French plan had been drawn up in 1946 and the offer made in 
1947 to any member of OEEC which was interested in negotiating 
to form a customs union with France. Italy was the only coun­
try to accept.
On 26 March 1949 the Treaty establishing the Franco- 
Italian customs union was finally signed. Even Schweitzer, 
President of the Interministerial Economic Committee set up 
to study questions of European cooperation, found it hard to 
justify to the Conseil Economique except as a step towards a 
European customs union. In economic terms Italian agriculture 
would compete with French agriculture and the Italians were 
even investing in developing a steel industry at a time when 
the other OEEC countries were saying that the French plan for 
steel would have to be reduced and their order for a second 
wide strip mill from the United States cut. Nor was it clear 
whether Italy would now have access to the Ruhr through what­
ever organization emerged from the London talks and thereby 
compete with France for coal and coke.32 The commit­
ment to setting up a customs union with Italy
was also seriously questioned when it became apparent that no 
formal attempt had been made to coordinate^ohg term programmes 
within OEEC to prevent competitive investments.
Discussions within the Conseil Economique continued 
during May 1949 revealing the opposition of the main agri­




























































































Similarly industrialists, and in particular the car and 
textile industries, despite official government sanction of 
private industrial agreements, were sceptical of their 
ability to restrain competition once tariffs were removed. 
Indeed, so great was the opposition to the union with France 
that it was not even presented to Parliament.
It had never been the intention of the French 
government, to have a customs union with Italy alone, but the 
problems since the war had been to convince the Benelux 
countries and Britain to associate more closely with France. 
With the customs union with Italy failing, and talks with 
Britain proving disappointing, Monnet tried to get American 
support for renewing French overtures to Benelux. In the 
middle of April he decided to test Harriman's reaction to a 
proposal to remove quantitative restrictions on the movement 
of capital, labour and as far as possible on trade between 
France, Italy and Benelux. The scheme was based on flexible 
exchange rates in the short term which recmired the approval 
of the IMF. Harriman's support was unambiguous since he 
claimed that it was along such lines that the United States 
envisaged the integration of the European economies. But 
Harriman hoped that the group could be enlarged to include 
Scandinavia and Germany at a later date (33).
The scheme was presented to Guindey in the Ministry of 
Finance early in May. In its most primitive form it entailed 




























































































Belgium, the partial or complete ending of import controls 
and the ending of export controls over all but essential 
goods while letting exchange rates float. But it was feared 
that the system of multiple exchange rates in France would 
encourage Italian and Belgian importers to buy goods from the 
dollar and sterling areas in France and to encourage French 
exporters to sell through the intermediary of either Italy or 
Belgium, with the result that France's dollar deficit would 
increase(34).
The announcement by ECA on 21 May that between 300 and 
400 million dollars would be set aside to finance a 
multilateral payments scheme in Europe provided a necessary 
incentive to improve on the French scheme. Yet as Petsche 
explained to Snyder, Secretary of the American Treasury, in 
July the real stumbling block for closer cooperation in 
Europe was the French obligation to respect the cross rate in 
commercial operations between the dollar and sterling. Since 
the pound was so overvalued if the French aligned the franc 
with the pound it was overvalued with respect to the dollar. 
Within Europe those countries which followed broadly similar
policies to Britain, such as Holland, aligned their currency
\
with sterling while others, such as Italy chose to base their 
rate on the dollar. This made it very difficult for those 
countries involved in the French scheme to reduce commercial 
and monetary restrictions when they were following such 




























































































of European cooperation according to Petsche was the dual 
pricing policy of Western Germany, and Britain especially of 
coal for export (35).
The Belgians tried to get round the problem of 
commercial cross rates by suggesting only the liberalization 
of capital movements and tourism under what the French called 
the "Brother Plan" (36). But the problem now was that since 
Belgium had not had restrictions on capital movements, the 
agreement would make no difference to the movement of Belgian 
capital into France or Italy but it could result in French 
and Italian capital going to Belgium and from there to 
Switzerland as a result of an agreement between Belgium and 
Switzerland. And the proposal to have floating exchange 
rates raised further problems. Since the French franc would 
almost certainly depreciate against the Belgian franc the 
Belgians feared this would provoke a reduction in French 
imports from Belgium thereby increasing unemployment in 
Belgium (37). In any case the French were interested in 
trade liberalization as well as the free movement of capital. 
As a possible compromise they suggested that financial 
transactions between the two countries could be carried out 
at a freely-floating rate of exchange but that commercial 
transactions would be carried out at a rate midway between 
the free and the floating rate of exchange, while all 
transactions between Italy and France and Belgium be carried 




























































































But then during the third quarter of 1949 France for 
the first time since the war became an overall creditor with 
the rest of Europe with exports at a higher level and imports 
at a lower level than in 1938. Confident in this knowledge 
Petsche chose to announce his plan to the Belgian, Italian 
and Dutch finance ministers in Washington on the last day of 
the tripartite talks between Britain, Canada and the United 
States. Under the plan exchange rates for capital and 
current transactions between all four countries were to float 
freely, all quota restrictions on trade were to be removed, 
capital was to move freely among the four, they were to 
withdraw support for the sterling dollar cross rates but 
tariffs were to remain unchanged. The Dutch were prepared to 
join in this arrangement provided that, since they had a 
deficit with the other three, but a surplus with the Sterling 
Area, that they could settle their deficits in sterling, and 
that the other three would agree to a common policy of 
restricting dollar purchases. Petsche made it clear that the 
scheme was designed to obtain the 150 million dollars set 
aside by ECA for regional groups which moved towards greater 
liberalization in trade and payments (39).
The State Department supported the scheme and hoped 
that the group could be enlarged to include Scandinavia and 
West Germany later on. But as they told Alphand it was 
preferable to leave Britain out of the scheme since it would 




























































































insisted the important thing was to present the scheme to 
Congress as evidence of progress towards liberalization (40). 
But after a meeting in Paris one month later the various 
American ambassadors in Europe concluded that any form of 
western European integration which did not include Britain 
would have little or no value (41).
The British Foreign Office was similarly ambivalent to 
the proposal. On the one hand it was quite desirable insofar 
as it seemed to join creditor and debtor countries in one 
monetary bloc but what they did oppose was any hint that the 
elimination of quotas would only be for trade between the 
four and therefore be discriminatory. The most intolerable 
aspect was the system of floating cross rates between the 
pound and the dollar (42). But several days later the whole 
context in which Petsche's plan.was to operate was changed. 
The size of the British devaluation provoked a hasty 
realignment of other European currencies and the subsequent 
large devaluation of the German mark. The French had 
insisted and been defeated in trying to link the German 
devaluation with the establishment of a single price for coal 
(43). (German coke had been selling at 13 dollars per tonne 
within Germany while the export price for the French steel 
industry was 25 dollars per tonne.)(44) This meant that the 
Dutch stipulation that Germany be included in the regional 
group from the beginning was even more unacceptable to the 




























































































Partly in response to the increasing American pressure 
to liberalize trade and payments in Europe which culminated 
in Hoffman's integration speech at the end of October 1949 
the French drew up a detailed draft of a modified scheme for 
the Fritalux countries. While OEEC had agreed on 2 November 
that each member was to have removed quotas on 50 per cent of 
its 1948 private imports from the rest of the group by 15 
December 1949 and to raise this to 60 per cent by the end of 
January 1950 provided that a satisfactory payments system had 
been agreed upon, the French hoped that their smaller 
regional group would be more liberal and would thus benefit 
from the dollar aid which Hoffman had promised would be 
available for integrated regional groups . They proposed that 
members should reduce quotas on not less than 60 per cent of 
their trade with each other and on 75 per cent by the end of 
1950. But as the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs made 
clear the liberalization of trade and payments among whatever 
number of countries (and their proposals were open to any 
interested member of OEEC) was not an end in itself. It 
would only facilitate a balance of payments in each country 
without dollar aid if it led to a reduction in costs of 
production. The structure of French trade was such that 
France had a trade surplus with v/estern Europe except for 
Germany but a persistent deficit with the sterling and dollar 
areas. (But the surplus with Belgium and Italy was only a 




























































































from Belgians and Italians working in France were
included.)(46) For these reasons the French were prepared to
liberalize trade within the Fritalux countries but the
problem was that that in itself would not alleviate the
sterling and dollar deficits. The Ministry of Finance was
convinced that only a harmonization of economic and monetary
policies which would - enable productivity gains to be made
through exploiting economies of scale would enable the
European countries to sell in North America and the Sterling
Area (47). This was the reason for the French insistence on
the harmonization of certain basic policies such as budgetary
and credit policies and the elimination of subsidies, double
pricing and other discriminatory practices in each member
country. Therefore not only was the regional group to move
towards free trade and payments but it was to have a distinct
administrative structure. This was to consist of a Regional
Council presided over by Foreign Ministers of each member
country together with a financial committee consisting of
Ministers of Finance and governors of national banks, which
would coordinate financial and credit policies, and an
v
economic committee consisting of Ministers of Trade, 
Industry, Agriculture and in the French case, the 
Commissariat au Plan. This committee would be charged with 
eliminating discriminatory practices, and controlling 
agreements between private industries. Since exchange rates 




























































































sterling, it was hoped that central banks would intervene to 
prevent wide fluctuations in the future. The French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs hoped that Britain would join the group 
and saw the advantage of German participation in terms of 
agricultural markets (48).
But ECA made it clear that this French proposal fell 
short of their hopes for regional integration. Belgium and 
Holland wanted the 75 per cent liberalization of total trade 
to be unconditional and certainly not dependent on the 
harmonization of their budgetary and credit policies and the 
elimination of discriminatory practices, while for France and 
Italy these conditions were the only basis for their 
agreement. But at the same time the French realized that if 
OEEC under British, or worse still German leadership, moved 
towards 75 per cent liberalization, the French position would 
become untenable. For these reasons they wanted to get 
agreement first among the five countries to preempt any 
decision being taken within OEEC. And if Britain opposed 
American plans for European integration, then an alternative 
existed in Fritalux.
Financial experts of France, Italy and Benelux met in 
Paris from 29 November until 9 December to discuss the French 
proposal but the result was, according to Guindey, "peu 
glorieux". Due to Dutch objections the return to 
convertibility of member currencies was to be very limited. 




























































































par value, and if the value of a currency fluctuated by more 
than five per cent in relation to another member's currency 
than its value in terms of the dollar had to change by the 
same amount. No agreement could be reached over the Question 
of whether 75 per cent liberalization of trade was to be 
dependent on the harmonization of fiscal and social policies, 
including the creation of a European Investment Bank (49). 
The Dutch insisted on the inclusion of Germany since they 
were debtors to the other participants and needed access to 
the German market for the scheme to be of any benefit to 
them. The French Minister of Agriculture also advocated 
German membership since the long-term plan for agriculture 
depended on selling the French surplus in Germany and Britain 
in particular but the Ministry of Industrial Production was 
resolutely opposed to removing quotas on German imports. The 
Belgians and Dutch pressed for a reduction in French tariffs 
which no one in France supported, while the Italian demand 
for the free movement of labour met with the sharp opposition 
of the French unions and the Minister of Labour. In the face 
of such a multitude of competing interests the Ouai d'Orsay 
thought it advisable to avoid a direct confrontation between 
governments, which could have disastrous consequences in the 
United States, by simply letting the discussions between 
experts drag on (50).
OEEC was to meet again in January to discuss the next 




























































































which would be acceptable to the Americans and justify the 
third allocation of Marshall Aid. This was in spite of the 
fact that both France and Britain had tried to postpone these 
discussions until the effect of the first removal of quotas 
on 50 per cent of 1948 private trade had been studied.
The French Cabinet met on 9 January 1950 to discuss its 
position regarding the liberalization of trade and payments 
within OEEC. Although France had been the main beneficiary 
of drawing rights in 1948 it had scarcely needed them in 1949 
so that the proposals to set up a central fund to which all 
countries would be debtors or creditors and their currencies 
freely convertible, did not worry the French unduly. In fact 
they saw it as the only way of paying for their imports from 
the Sterling Area (51). But trade liberalization was more of 
a problem. Since Holland, Belgium and West Germany were all 
in favour of greater liberalization it was feared that France 
would be forced to comply, if it did not take the initative 
and offer an alternative. The simple solution was to extend 
to all OEEC countries the measures of trade liberalization 
agreed for Finebel, provided that other policies were 
harmonized and discriminatory practices ended. But this 
would mean that France would have to liberalize 75 per cent 
of its trade with West Germany which was totally unacceptable 
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
A more flexible solution lay in distinguishing between 




























































































raw materials and manufactured goods. While it was felt that 
France was in a position to liberalize ninety per cent of 
private trade in the first two categories, this was not true 
for manufactured goods. But a study showed that on the basis 
of 1948 trade, if 75 per cent of private trade in 
manufactures were liberalized this would in fact only mean 
liberalizing a further eight per cent of total trade. So if 
it had to liberalize trade with Germany anyway then perhaps 
the arguments for excluding Germany from Finebel were not so 
convincing. Indeed if through Finebel, the French were able 
to end discriminatory practices in Germany, then perhaps 
there was a case for including Germany (52) but not offering 
it the same percentage of liberalization from the beginning.
The Finebel experts met again from 19-21 January 1950 
to try to agree on a set of proposals to present to 
governments before OEEC met again on 26 January. They 
accepted the French proposal to extend to all OEEC countries 
the degree of trade liberalization which they had agreed 
among themselves provided that all discriminatory practices 
such as dual-pricing and dumping were ended. This meant that 
60 per cent of private trade was to be liberalized by the 
beginning of whatever payments union was agreed and 75 per 
cent by the end of 1950. But Kali-Patch made it clear that 
the British government could not renounce dual pricing which 
was so central to its general policy just before an election. 




























































































their report to governments before the meeting of OEEC (53).
But when the OEEC countries failed to agree with
American conditions for a European Payments Union later that
month Hoffman and Harriman turned in exasperation to the 
Finebel countries and once again mentioned the possibility of 
dollar aid if they at least could make some concrete moves 
towards integrating their economies. But they were not
supported in this by Bissel and the Planning Group since they
continued to see Finebel as an obstacle to wider integration 
(54). And indeed there were various motives behind the 
albeit limited support for Finebel within France. There was 
a current of opinion within the Ministry of Finance which 
wanted Finebel to be set up immediately to try to prevent 
further liberalization within OEEC, or at least to influence 
as a coherent bloc whatever decisions were taken. On the 
other hand, Guindey supported Finebel as a means of 
introducing the financial discipline and orthodoxy into 
France which was practiced by Belgium and Italy. Private 
industry as represented by Villiers, President of the Conseil 
National du Patronat Français,supported the original French 
proposals for Finebel chiefly because the systems of floating 
exchange rates would keep French export prices in line and 
because the financial orthodoxy required would probably cause 
unemployment in France and curb wage demands (55).
It was precisely for these reasons that it was rejected 




























































































that far from reducing the European dollar shortage Finebel 
would only increase it since neither Belgium nor West Germany 
showed any signs of cutting back on dollar imports. Not only 
that but they were afraid to do anything which would cause a 
rift between continental Europe and Britain and this was for 
two reasons. On the one hand it was the fear of being alone 
with the problem of Germany but the other was the idea that 
France's economic future lay in trade with Britain and the 
Sterling Area. American pressure for liberalizatoin was 
Monnet felt, too high a price to pay perhaps for further 
Marshall Aid (56). In a meeting between Cripps and Petsche 
early in February they agreed that Germany should not be 
invited to join either Finebel or Uniskan until the three 
Allies had debated both the political and economic aspects of 
the German question in the spring. This meant that if the 
Dutch continued to make German participation from the outset 
a precondition for their own membership, then Finebel would 
not be set up (57).
Under pressure from Stikker and the Belgians the 
experts met again on 15 and 16 February in Paris and 
published a revised version of the conclusions which they had 
reached in December. But since the introduction to the 
report stated that each government would make its position 
regarding German membership known later, the importance of 
their conclusions was immediately diminished. Nevertheless 




























































































investment decisions and facilitate agreements between 
private industrialists, allow the free movement of labour and 
eliminate discriminatory practices (58). But that same day 
the British announced that they were ready to support talks 
to set up a European Payments Union, and suggested that 
Finebel should be postponed. As the French realized if 
Finebel were not set up immediately, there would be no point 
in setting it up at all since the wider European Payments 
Union would probably make it completely redundant. One 
section of the Ministry of Finance argued that it should be 
set up at once without Germany since its immediate inclusion 
would create financial problems and would cause a rift 
between Britain and continental Europe. But Stikker on his 
way to Washington argued that nothing could be done until his 
return and until the Dutch government had debated the German 
question (59).
Nothing was done and by early March Guindey had started 
to consider the merits of joining the British Uniskan scheme 
(60). One month later, before waiting for the Allies to 
debate the German question Schuman announced the scheme which 
from an economic point of view promised to end the 
disadvantage suffered by French industry due to the high cost 
of imported coal from Germany without having to open up the 





























































































No one disputes that in the long term French policy 
makers favoured the removal of trade barriers and the full 
participation of the French economy in an expanding 
international economy. But since exports had only been about 
9 per cent of French GNP in 1938 the issue was not perceived 
as being crucial to French reconstruction —  an 
interpretation which historians have readily accepted. But 
it was precisely because the French planners dismissed the 
problem of the dollar gap as being entirely due to the 
abnormal needs of reconstruction and therefore not a 
structural problem that the original basis of the plan had to 
be altered two years later. In 1948 a long term plan 
replaced the Monnet Plan which was no longer based on the 
French economy replacing the German economy as the centre of 
heavy industry in Europe. The long term plan placed balance 
of payments considerations ahead of domestic French needs and 
aspirations. Thus the agricultural sector was to be expanded 
to be a foreign exchange earner in Europe while investment 
and exports to the French Overseas Territories were to be 
increased in order to make them, rather than Metropolitan 
France significant dollar earners. But even then it was felt 
that the dollar deficit would persist after the end of 
Marshall Aid. This analysis lay behind French attempts to 
coordinate their economic and monetary policies with other 




























































































could compete with the United States. Britain did not want 
to join such a group and without Britain, only the Ministry 
of Finance was prepared to cooperate with countries which 
pursued orthodox monetary policies. The real stumbling block 
though which no French policy maker could overcome was the 
Dutch insistence on German membership of sxich a group. while 
the German market was a necessary outlet for the planned 
expansion of French agriculture, French industry feared 
German competition. The original Monnet Plan had avoided 
this problem since it was based on the elimination of Germany 
as a major competitor. The Schuman Plan attempted a partial 
solution by forcing the French steel industry -- a major 
beneficiary of Marshall Aid -- into open competition with the 
German steel industry provided that a major bone of 
contention namely the dual pricing of coal, was ended. The 
rest of the French economy continued to export to the safe 
colonial markets throughout the 1950s so that by 1958 when 
the larger Common Market was set up, they were taking almost 
40 per cent of total French exports making France the most 





























































































*The archives used in this paper are those of the French 
Comité Economique Interministériel (F60), the Secrétariat 
Général Interministériel pour les questions de Coopération 
Economique européenne (F60Bis) although the classification is 
still only provisional, the economic files of the Ministère 
des Relations Extérieures although once again the
classification was provisional when I used them, the 
Ministère de l'Industrie (F12), the records of the British 
Foreign Office, Board of Trade and Treasury and the records 
of the American State Department, Treasury and National 
Advisory Council.
1. Truman Library, Treasury File, Box 129, Fred Vinson 
collection 6. France Meetings April-June 1946, Monnet to 
NAC. '
2. S.D. 851.51/1-446. Caffery to Secretary of State, 
15 Jan. 1946.
3. A.N. F60 923. Instructions to French Delegation to 
Washington from Ministère des Relations Extérieures.
4. Min. des Reis.Ext. A194-J.47 Affaires Etrangères. 




























































































5. Min.des Reis.Ext. A194-J.47 Affaires Etrangères. 
Note 15 Feb.1946.
6. US Treasury Files.NAC. Meeting no.13,21 Feb. 1946.
7. Min.des Reis.Ext. A194-J.46 Affaires Etrangères.
Statistics.
8. Truman Library, Treasury File Box 129. Vinson 
collection 6.France Meetings April-June 1946.
9. A.N. F60 902. Meeting, 22 Feb. 1946.
10. Truman Library, Office Files of Assistant Secretary
of State, subject file M. Box 4, Discussion 18 April 1946.
11. PRO BT 11/3203. Bidault to Attlee, 31 Aug. 1946.
12., Direction Générale des Douanes.
13.. Min.des Reis.Ext. A174-J. 48 Affaires Etrangères,
25 Sept.. 1947.
14.. F.Caron, 'Le Plan Mayer:Un retour aux réalités', in
Colloquium organized by Fondation Nationale des Sciences 





























































































15. US Treasury,NAC Senior Staff Executive Session 
Minutes.Meetings, Jan-February 1948.
16. US Treasury,NAC Meeting 22 January 1948.
17. F60Bis 378. Commission de l'Economie Nationale du 
Conseil Economique, 12 April 1949.
18. F12 10325. Meeting of the Commissariat au Plan, 19 
June 1948.
19. Jean Monnet, Mémoires(Paris,1976), p.326.
20. F60Bis 460. Meeting of the SGICEE, 5 October 1948.
21. J.Le Bourva, L'Inflation française d'après-guerre 
1945-1949 (Paris,1950).
22. F6OBis 497. Meeting of SGICEE, 15 Dec. 1948 .
23. F60Bis 358. Conversation between Bruce and
Queuille,16 Nov.1948.





























































































25. F60Bis 357. Preparation for discussion with
Cripps, 15 Jan. 1949.
26. F60Bis 474. Note from M.Reyre, Directeur général 
de la Banque de Paris et Pays Bas, to Valensi,26 Nov.1948.
27. F60Bis 474. Comment from Guindey, 8 December 1948.
28. PRO,T229/207. Talks between Monnet, Hirsch, 
Riefler and Plowden, 17 February 1949.
29. FO 371/77932. Meetings between British and French 
Officials, 28 February and 1 March 1949.
30. T229/209. R.Willis' reflections on conversation 
with Monnet, 18 March 1949.
31. T229/207. Memo on the Bizone by Ogilvy Webb, March
1949 .
32. F60Bis 378. Meeting of Commission de l'Economie 
Nationale du Conseil Economiaue, 12 April 1949.





























































































34. F60Bis 469. Memo to Guindey, 9 May 1949.
35. F60Bis 469. Conversation between Petsche and 
Snyder, 5 July 1949.
36. Presumably this referred to Maurice Frère, Director 
of the Bank of Belgium.
37. F60Bis 469. de Margerie to Guindey,26 July 1949.
38. F60Bis 469. Projet 'C', 22 August 1949.
39. FO 371/78111, Washington to Foreign Office, 17 
Sept. 1949.
40. F60Bis 383. Bonnet to Sweitzer, 9 September 1949.
41. FRUS 1949, vol. IV, pp. 342-344. Bruce to 
Acheson,22 October 1949.
42. FO 371/7811. Foreign Office report, 21 September
1949 .





























































































44. F6 QRi s 412. Meeting of SGICEE,21 February 1949.
45. F60Bis 469. Proposal from Ministêre des Affaires 
Etrangères,14 Nov. 1949.
46. Min.des Reis.Ext. Note, 22 December 1949 .
47. F60Ris 469. Repeated in numerous memos of the
Ministry of Finance.
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Service de Coopération Economique, 7 Jan. 1950.
51. F6OBis 460. SGICEE,2 3 January 1953 .
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